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 In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives one of the first statements 
of the rule of law when he says: “we allow only reason, not a human being, to be ruler.”1 
Aristotle then divides political justice into two parts.  “One part of the politically just is 
natural, and the other part legal.  The natural has the same validity everywhere alike, 
independent of its seeming so or not.”2  This characterization of the natural part of justice 
is sometimes associated with the so-called natural duties of justice, specifically with the 
substantive duties to promote just institutions.  But, it seems that Aristotle, at least at that 
point in his Ethics, is referring to something procedural, what might be called ‘natural 
fairness.’   
In my view, the debate between Hart and Fuller about the internal aspect of rules 
or the inner morality of law concerns an issue that is similar to what Aristotle meant by 
the natural part of justice, namely that part of natural fairness that stays the same from 
society to society, and perhaps even outside of particular societies – for instance, in the 
international arena.  In this respect one could ask whether there is something like a 
natural duty to support procedures, such as habeas corpus, that provide minimal fairness 
for those who have been incarcerated or detained. And if there is such a duty, is it part of 
the inner morality of law? In his eighth desiderata of the rule of law, Fuller mentions such 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1134a35. 
2 Ibid., 1134b20. 
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things as habeas corpus as an aspect of procedural due process, but he does little more 
than mention it; Hart does not mention it at all. But both legal theorists are focused as 
much on procedural as substantive justice.   
 In what follows I will investigate what Fuller called “procedural natural law” in 
contemporary international criminal law.  Most of the theoretical and normative writings 
about international criminal law have so far been about substantive law, focusing on the 
four crimes over which the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction: crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression.3  International justice is 
thought to have come to maturity as these four substantive crimes have been prosecuted 
by international tribunals and courts. In my view, it is time for international legal 
theorists and practitioners to take into account procedural issues in as much detail as has 
been given to substantive ones.  I will argue that procedural rights are part of what 
constitutes the rule of law and are especially important as gap fillers in creating an 
international rule of law that respects fundamental fairness. International criminal law 
will not come to maturity as a system of law unless protections of fundamental fairness, 
such as a global right of habeas corpus, are put in place.   
 In this paper I will use the Hart/Fuller debate as a springboard for assessing 
procedural rights within the context of the international rule of law.  In the first two 
sections I will rehearse the relevant part of the Hart/Fuller debate as it pertains to the 
subject of international law and also to the inner morality of law.  In the third section I 
will set out some of my views on these matters, drawing on both Hart and Fuller, 
                                                 
3 I have written studies of each of these substantive international crimes: Crimes Against Humanity: A 
Normative Account  (Cambridge University Press, 2005); War Crimes and Just War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2008); and 
Genocide: A Normative Account, (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2009). 
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concerning the value of fundamental procedural rights. In the fourth section I will discuss 
the right of habeas corpus, as a good test case of how to think about these issues.  In the 
final sections I will expand on these remarks and argue that procedural rights need to be 
better protected in international law, if it is to have a claim to legitimacy as a mature legal 
system. 
 
I. Hart on International Law and the Rule of Law 
H.L.A. Hart draws a distinction between primary rules, in which “human beings 
are required to do or abstain from certain actions,” and secondary rules, which may 
introduce, extinguish, or modify primary rules.4  Hart is often interpreted as requiring a 
rule of recognition, which involves secondary rules that establish how primary rules are 
to be recognized as valid law; indeed Ronald Dworkin talks about the rule of recognition 
as a “master rule” for Hart.5 Yet, in Hart’s treatment of international law in the final 
chapter of his book, The Concept of Law, he does not deny that international law is law, 
even though international law, at least in the early 1960s, seemed to Hart to lack a rule of 
recognition. In this respect, consider the final sentence of his book: 
Bentham, the inventor of the expression ‘international law,’ defended it simply by 
saying that it was ‘sufficiently analogous’ to municipal law. To this two 
comments are perhaps worth adding. First, that the analogy is one of content not 
of form; secondly, that in the analogy of content, no other social rules are so close 
to municipal law as those of international law.6 
                                                 
4 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, 1994, p. 81. 
5 For example see Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules I,” Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 
1977, p. 41. 
6 Ibid., p. 237. 
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This is not to say that formal features of a system of rules were unimportant to Hart. But 
on the penultimate page of his book, Hart spoke of emancipating “ourselves from the 
assumption that international law must contain a basic rule.”7   
Hart himself often says that law is best understood as the “union of primary and 
secondary rules.”  But by the last chapter of his book, the chapter on international law, 
Hart is at pains to point out that while this union provides a “sufficient condition for the 
application of the expression ‘legal system’” he has not claimed “that the word ‘law’ 
must be defined in its terms.” Instead, he says that the “idea of a union of primary and 
secondary rules…may be regarded as a mean between juristic extremes.”8  Arguably, 
what is even more important for Hart for establishing that a set of rules is a legal system 
is whether the people who live under the set of rules have an internal perspective or point 
of view toward these rules, where one is concerned with rules “as a member of a group 
which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.”9 
For Hart, the internal perspective is crucial for legal systems, but there are 
arguably two candidates for this perspective, only one of which is truly so. What is 
crucial for distinguishing “social rules from mere group habits” “is that there should be a 
critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behavior as a common standard, and that 
this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, 
and in acknowledgement that such criticism and demands are justified…”10  Taking this 
internal perspective is crucial for the proper functioning of a system of rules that is 
considered authoritative and deserving of obedience. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 236. 
8 Ibid., p. 212. 
9 Ibid., p. 89. 
10 Ibid., p. 57. 
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In Hart’s view, international law can be law properly so-called.  In the early 1960s 
Hart already recognized that international law very closely resembled domestic municipal 
law in its content, although not in its form, since international law lacked a rule of 
recognition. Indeed, Hart probably would say something different today, especially with 
the institution of the International Criminal Court and its complex statute, as well as with 
the growing recognition and acceptance of the legitimacy of international law in nearly 
all quarters. But there is another way to understand the legitimacy of the claim that 
international law is law properly so called.   
International law is easier to understand if one focuses on such things as “the 
internal aspect of rules” rather than sovereignty which creates or enforces a master rule. 
As Hart recognized, there is an “absence of an international legislature, courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized sanctions.” These absences have 
inspired “misgivings” about whether international law is properly called law, especially 
since the absence of such things seems to indicate a lack of a rule of recognition.11  Hart 
was seemingly not one of the people who had these misgivings, at least not in a way that 
made him doubt that international law could be law properly so called.  The fact that Hart 
recognized that many saw international law as a “doubtful case,”12 and that he placed 
international law in his last chapter, indicates that he also saw it as a hard case.  But as I 
have been arguing, he probably also saw international law as a good example for 
discussing the relative importance of the internal point of view as opposed to the union of 
primary and secondary rules in identifying when there is a system of law.   
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 214. 
12 Ibid., p. 3. 
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In eventually taking up the case of procedural rights like habeas corpus it will be 
important to remember that Hart stressed the importance of “demands for conformity” 
with primary rules, as well as a “centrally organized system of sanctions.”  In 
international law, especially international criminal law, both of these factors are currently 
hard to satisfy in a rigorous way since there is no sovereign international state that can 
accomplish or facilitate these things.  But gaps in sanctions can be filled without a fully 
centralized system in place, especially if the relevant officials take an internal perspective 
toward the law. Especially in high profile cases, indictment and arrest procedures that are 
piecemeal can go a long ways, as can other piecemeal ways to protect substantive rights 
internationally.   
At the end of the paper, I will take up the case of the Guantanamo detainees who 
tried to get their substantive rights protected even though there was no centrally 
organized international sanctioning power.  The Guantanamo detainees filed habeas 
corpus petitions in order to put public pressure on the United States government to 
protect their substantive rights. And in addition, habeas corpus appeals sought to prevent 
the “legal black holes” that had seemingly opened because of a lack of a gapless 
international legal system.  In this sense, habeas corpus was a gap-filler that helped 
establish an international rule of law even though there are still not executive and 
legislative branches of an international government. 
As international law comes to have more institutional arrangements that are like 
municipal law, Hart was right to think that it will resemble municipal law in form as well 
as in content.  And we are certainly moving in this direction with the creation of the 
International Criminal Court with some compulsory jurisdiction and centrally organized 
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sanctions, at least for those States that have ratified the Rome Treaty. And as the Security 
Council acts more and more like a world legislature, similarly international law moves 
closer to municipal law. There is still a lack of fully centralized sanctions in international 
law, although the various appellate courts at the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC have been striving 
valiantly to create a piecemeal uniformity of sanctions, despite lacking a fully centralized 
mechanism of enforcement of its indictments and judgments.  But in the mean time, what 
has been most striking since the early 1960s, when Hart wrote his book, is how far the 
world community has moved in developing an internal perspective on international law, 
especially international criminal law. And with the development of this perspective, some 
of Hart’s worries about international law have been addressed. 
In chapter 9 of The Concept of Law, Hart launches his own positive discussion of 
natural law by explaining that there is a “rational connection between natural facts and 
the content of legal and moral rules.”  Without a minimal natural content to the law, 
“men, as they are, would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules.” 13 At least 
some members of the society must voluntarily accept the rules. “Without their voluntary 
cooperation, thus creating authority, the coercive power of law and government cannot be 
established”14  And for the system to be most stable, these people “must conceive of 
themselves as morally bound to do so.”15  The natural facts must be satisfied for such an 
acceptance, and their acceptance is expressed in “internal statements” but this does not 
mean that they “are thereby committed to a moral judgment.”16  
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 93. 
14 Ibid., p. 201. 
15 Ibid., p. 203 
16 Ibid. 
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So for Hart there is a relationship between the minimal content of natural law and 
the internal perspective; but what is unclear is exactly what the relationship is.  And more 
importantly for my paper, why restrict the relevant natural facts to the content of rules 
instead of also to the minimal form of these rules.  Would Hart recognize the kind of 
procedural natural law that Fuller discussed, and that Aristotle seemed also to embrace. 
Hart seems to suggest that the form also matters, when he addresses Fuller directly by 
claiming that “in general [rules] must not be retrospective, though exceptionally they may 
be.”17  Hart even allows that such considerations may properly be called “the inner 
morality of law” yet he couches this acceptance of Lon Fuller’s terminology by then 
stipulating “It is unfortunately compatible with very great iniquity.”18    
Some content and also some form seems to be required for law to attain the 
voluntary acceptance of some of the population.  Hart has put his finger on a crucial point 
– certain things are required for any system of rules to attain sufficient voluntary 
acceptance in a population to be called a system of law. And Hart’s own emphasis on 
secondary rules as involving largely procedural matters points us toward what must be 
better secured in international law if there is to be a system of law in the international 
domain that achieves acceptance as well. Or at least this is one way to interpret Hart’s 
claim that international law resembles municipal law in content but not yet in form. 
When international law acquires municipal law’s form it will then have a claim to be a 
mature system of law. As I will indicate in the ensuing discussion of Fuller, the form that 
is most important is that there is a guarantee of formal fairness that largely comes from 
the protection of procedural rights. 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 207. 
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II. Fuller on Procedural Natural Law 
Lon Fuller was critical of many of the theses and arguments advanced by Hart, 
but there is nonetheless a striking similarity in how they regarded the internal perspective 
of a system of law.  Hart does recognize the connection between this internal perspective 
and what he called the minimal content of the natural law, and Fuller makes this 
connection more explicit and in that sense moves us forward in understanding what needs 
to happen for international law to become a mature system of law.  Whether or not Fuller 
really does fit into the natural law tradition, he does link something like Hart’s internal 
perspective to certain minimal natural law, and what he also calls moral, considerations 
that have historically been identified with the rule of law.  
For Fuller, there are eight desiderata that when not satisfied lead to disaster for the 
rule of law.  Here are the ways failure can occur: 
(1) a failure to have rules at all; 
(2) a failure to publicize…the rules; 
(3) the abuse of retroactive legislation; 
(4) a failure to make rules understandable; 
(5) the enactment of contradictory rules; 
(6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 
(7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient  
his action by them; 
(8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual  
administration.19 
                                                 
19 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, 1969, pp. 39 and 96.  
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 And Fuller helps us understand what is necessary for a set of rules to be a legal 
system when he says that his eight desiderata concern  
a procedural, as distinguished from a substantive, natural law. What I have called 
the internal morality of law is in this sense a procedural version of natural law, 
though to avoid misunderstanding the word ‘procedural’ should be assigned a 
special and expanded sense so that it would include, for example, a substantive 
accord between official action and enacted law.20   
For Fuller, “substantive natural law” concerns “the proper ends to be sought through legal 
rules.”21  Procedural natural law is necessary for rules to be rules at all, and for them to 
form a system.  In this respect there appears to be a connection between the internal 
perspective on rules that Hart identified and Fuller’s inner morality of law. 
The inner morality of law is a set of procedures, such as non-retroactivity, that 
rules must conform to in order for there to be a system of rules at all. As Hart pointed out, 
to call this an inner “morality” is questionable, especially since it is compatible with great 
iniquity.  Fuller contends that a system of rules that satisfied his eight desiderata would 
not be a system that could be gravely iniquitous.  Whether properly moral or not, there is 
no doubt that these desiderata are procedural constraints on rules that when adhered to 
make of these rules a system of rules that is deserving of respect.  And in that sense they 
satisfy Hart’s concern that law appeal at least to some members of society as fair and just 
and hence deserving of their voluntary cooperation and recognition as being authoritative.  
One way to begin to understand the possibility of common ground between Hart and 
                                                 
20 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
21 Ibid., p. 98. 
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Fuller is to see that the inner morality of law must be satisfied in order for people within 
the system of rules to take an internal perspective toward these rules.  
In my view, Hart and Fuller did not really disagree much about what constitutes 
the inner morality of law.  Rather they disagreed about whether and to what extent it 
really was a ‘morality’ that connected to ideas such as justice and fairness in a way that 
blocks iniquity within a system of law.  In another place I have suggested that this was at 
best a minimal moral notion, but that is not to denigrate its moral character nonetheless.22 
Perhaps this is merely to say that these requirements must be satisfied for a system of law 
to deserve our fidelity to it, where this might capture what both Hart and Fuller wanted, 
although they both failed to recognize an important aspect of these procedures. 
For Fuller, concerning any legal system the procedural natural law can be 
summarized in one expression, “due process of law.”23 Fuller gives as an example 
“judicial review.”24 And he says “What law must foreseeably do to achieve its aims, is 
something quite different from law itself.”25  But why does Fuller think that certain 
procedural matters are not properly part of the legal system, rather than merely being 
different types of procedure within a system of law? Perhaps some procedures directly 
protect substantive rights and others do so in a less direct, although no less important 
way.  Indeed that is what he says of the eighth desiderata.  There may be due process 
rights that guarantee that legal systems have a substantive fairness. But also there may be 
other procedural matters that protect the formal fairness of a system of law without 
having much to do with any particular substantive right. 
                                                 
22 See my treatment of this topic in the first few chapters of my book, Crimes Against Humanity: A 
Normative Account (Cambridge UP, 2005). 
23 Fuller, ibid., p. 103. 
24 Ibid., p. 104. 
25 Ibid., p. 108. 
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Fuller says, “It is precisely when the legal system takes up weapons of violence 
that we impose on it the most stringent requirements of due process.” Fuller then says 
that whenever people embark on “subjecting certain kinds of human conduct to the 
explicit control of rules” “they come to see that this enterprise contains a certain inner 
logic of its own, that it imposes demands that must be met (sometimes with considerable 
inconvenience) if its objectives are to be attained.”26 But Fuller did not seem to see that 
some rules, like those of habeas corpus, could be very important and yet not necessarily 
protect any substantive rights. Indeed, habeas corpus is just the kind of procedural right 
that would protect formal as opposed to substantive fairness of a system of law, since 
what habeas corpus primarily protects against is arbitrariness of decisions. 
For Fuller, following his eight desiderata would require that there be stringent 
rules of due process for there to be international criminal law.  And this includes judicial 
review, something currently lacking.  As I will argue later, I believe that one of the best 
things to do to begin to bridge this gap is for there to be an institutionalized international 
version of procedural natural law including a right of habeas corpus. In criminal matters, 
habeas corpus functions as a rudimentary basis of something like judicial review. 
Interestingly, Fuller does mention habeas corpus once in The Morality of Law, and links 
it to “procedural due process” under his eighth desiderata, the “Congruence Between 
Official Action and Declared Rule.”27 And he did recognize that it is in this eighth 
desiderata that there would be rules that were not necessarily themselves part of the legal 
system. But he didn’t put these pieces together and hence missed an important point for 
law in general and international law in particular. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
27 Ibid., p. 81. 
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III. Valuing Visibleness and the Rule of Law  
In considering the idea of formal or procedural natural law, one wonders whether 
Hart would recognize a “minimal form of the natural law” similar to the “minimal 
content of the natural law.” Would Hart regard certain procedural matters, such the right 
to habeas corpus, as similar to the substantive prohibitions on murder or theft, as key 
components for any legal system, given what we know of humans? While neither Hart 
nor Fuller addressed this issue directly, I believe that key components of the rule of law 
would indeed be seen by both theorists as important for the natural justice of a legal 
system. In what follows, I am sympathetic to Fuller’s brief suggestion that a version of 
procedural natural law involves a right of habeas corpus, among other basic due process 
rights. In criminal matters, habeas corpus functions as a rudimentary basis of something 
like judicial review. 
The value of habeas corpus concerns what I call the normative principle of 
visibleness28 in detention and incarceration as a counter to the secrecy that masks 
arbitrary exercise of power in this domain.  Habeas corpus stands for the proposition at its 
most minimal, but also at its most powerful, that no one can be hidden in jail or prison.  
And the reason for this is that such secrecy is too likely to hide mistreatment and abuse.  
Henry Maine said that “substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in 
the interstices of procedure.”29  It is fitting that what is secreted in the interstices of the 
procedural right of habeas corpus is the moral principle against secrecy in confinement.  
Habeas corpus is in one respect the idea that the body of the prisoner must literally be 
made publicly visible, but this very rudimentary procedure has very great value. 
                                                 
28 The OED lists, as one of the earliest uses of the term visibleness, a 16th century reference to the fact that 
the Catholic Church did not maintain open procedures. 
29 Sir Henry Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1886, p. 389. 
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 For several thousand years, philosophers have embraced the idea that if one were 
invisible the normal moral constraints would not be operative. This is presumably as true 
of Plato’s Lydian shepherd who could make himself invisible and hence avoid detection 
of his crimes, as of the jailer who can make the prisoner invisible and hence hide the 
jailer’s crimes as well. Arbitrariness often seems to need the cloak of secrecy and 
invisibility. The Lydian shepherd may use his new power for the good of his people, but 
if he then chooses to use if for ill, there is no stopping him from doing so.  The ruler, or 
jailer, who discovers that he can render a person invisible from public view, may also use 
this power for wrongdoing, or for hiding wrongdoing, and such abuse of power is at least 
partially stopped by the anticipation of habeas corpus appeals. 
The principle of visibleness does not guarantee that those who are detained or 
incarcerated will not be treated wrongly or even that they will be treated fairly, but only 
that if they are to be treated unfairly it cannot be done completely in secret.  Blackstone, 
writing in the 18th century, put this point quite well: 
But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his 
sufferings are unknown and forgotten; is a less public, a less striking, and 
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.30 
Security of the person is often a key by-product of habeas corpus. The principle of 
visibleness is a protection of personal security, which, as Justice Kennedy said, “subsists, 
too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.”31 
The prospect of the revelation of the wrongdoing through even a very rudimentary 
habeas corpus procedure may act as a deterrent against the wrongdoing occurring at all, 
                                                 
30 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), facsimile of the first edition, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, Volume 1, p. 132. 
31 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ____ (2008), p. 68.  
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or against similar wrongdoings occurring in the future. And in this sense habeas corpus is 
clearly related to a human good, namely that wrongdoing should not occur.  But habeas 
corpus is not directly related to this good, but indirectly so.  And it is my view that this is 
the way that procedural rights are normally related to substantive ones.  Procedural rights 
do not normally have value in themselves, but only as they somehow support substantive 
rights. There is one exception to this idea and that concerns the so-called rule of law.   
 Merely having some procedural rules that govern human affairs is often thought 
to be of value insofar as rule by these rules is better than rule by “man.”  In this sense rule 
by rules is definitive of the rule of law and against the kind of arbitrariness that comes 
when people make decisions unconstrained by rules. Procedural rules have value here 
because they are constitutive of a norm, not merely because they support some other 
norm.  The norm that these procedural rules constitute is itself a procedure.  Procedural 
rights can have intrinsic value in that they are constitutive of a rule of law which 
promotes fairness. In this sense, procedural rights do not necessarily have content and 
while they aim at a certain good, that good, fairness and non-arbitrariness, need not have 
content, unlike the goods that substantive rights aim at such as property rights or free 
speech rights which have content and aim at a human good. 
Non-arbitrariness is related to a type of fairness that involves complying with a 
rule joined with a system of overseeing that the rule is complied with. Political orders are 
arbitrary both by having rule by the whim of a person or persons, instead of by a rule, and 
by having no oversight.  The value of non-arbitrariness is hard to characterize.  There is a 
kind of formal fairness that is achieved when procedural rights are respected. Habeas 
corpus provides a minimal rule for how jailers and rulers should behave, and also a 
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rudimentary system for oversight.  In this sense habeas corpus epitomizes procedural 
fairness. Of course, there is also value to procedural rights in the various ways that they 
are means to substantive ends. 
Habeas corpus was initially thought of as merely the right to be brought from the 
dungeon and told of the charges against one.  At nearly the same time, the right also came 
to be seen as a right to have those charges assessed to see if there was a prima facie 
reason to think that they had any basis, and this was understood as the right not to be 
arbitrarily incarcerated.  Later, habeas corpus came to stand for the right to due process in 
general.  And later still habeas corpus was understood, as it is today in the American 
system of law, as a right to challenge an incarceration on the basis of any of one’s 
significant constitutional liberties. So, the history of habeas corpus incorporates at least 
three different ways to understand this right.  In the first instance, habeas corpus is a non-
derivative procedural right since the right to be brought into the light of day and told of 
the charges against one does not address the substantive charges or the eventual trial of 
the accused.  In the second instance, the right becomes a derivative procedural right, 
especially when it is seen as protecting certain substantive rights such as the right against 
arbitrary denial of liberty.  Finally, habeas corpus comes to be seen as a substantive right, 
to particular constitutional liberties.  
Habeas corpus can be constitutive of the rule of law in that it is clearly better that 
prisoners be treated according to a regime that has the habeas corpus rule than subject to 
the possibly arbitrary rule of their jailers.  Habeas corpus is a paradigmatic constituent of 
the rule of law insofar as it stands against the arbitrary exercise of authority.  Generally, 
the rule of law concerns the limitation on a ruler’s authority by rules imposed on rulers, 
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not made by them.  The value of the rule of law, as with the value of habeas corpus which 
is itself part of the rule of law, is not merely in the substantive values it advances but also, 
in a curious way, in the value that inheres in a system of rules that restricts, or places 
“stops” in the way of, arbitrariness.  Arbitrariness is a disvalue in itself that is not 
necessarily connected to a specific human good, at least not in a direct way.  
Concerning rights like habeas corpus, Larry Alexander has argued that these 
procedural rights have value only as that value derives from the substantive right “to 
liberty from confinement.”32  I do not deny that sometimes this is true of procedural 
rights like habeas corpus. But I think that the more important and more interesting value 
of habeas corpus has to do with its intrinsic value as part of the rule of law.  And here 
what is important is protecting people against arbitrariness that may not support any other 
substantive right.  It may be that the liberty from confinement is unaffected by habeas 
corpus rights since the prisoner gains only very temporary removal from confinement 
associated with this right, as I have indicated above. Alexander may be right that there is 
a worry about certain risks, but specifying what the risk is in the case of a denial of 
habeas rights is not always easy to do. And it is sometimes unclear what substantive right 
is risked when the rule of law is denied. I follow Fuller in thinking that a version of 
procedural natural law involves a rudimentary right of habeas corpus, among other basic 
procedural rights, and that such rights form the basis for at least a minimal moral fairness 
in a system of law.  
 
IV. Fundamental Procedural Rights   
                                                 
32 Larry Alexander, “Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?” Law and Philosophy, vol. 17, 
no. 1, January 1998, p. 31. 
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When there is no Constitution, fundamental law typically refers to certain long-
standing customs, perhaps even being “fixed and unalterable.”33 The customs themselves 
may articulate principles, but they are not the same as the principles, and certainly do not 
gain their authoritativeness merely from being long-standing.34  The principles are moral 
principles that derive their authority in the way all moral principles do, because of their 
claim to legitimacy.  Typically there are a small set of substantive principles that are 
thought to be definitive of a particular political society, such as freedom of speech, press, 
and association, or nondiscrimination on the basis of race or gender. Like the principles 
that undergird a Constitution, in a society without a Constitution there are principles that 
also provide a foundation for the political and legal system. 
“Fundamental law” is a phrase that came to have its most important meaning in 
17th Century England.  Habeas corpus is not itself fundamental law in the sense of being a 
body of substantive principles undergirding a legal system, but habeas corpus can be 
significantly intertwined with fundamental law. Procedural, not merely substantive, rights 
are significant in fundamental law because of the two important roles procedural rights 
play. As we saw above, some procedural rights are instrumentally valuable as they 
complement substantive rights. One way that they can do this is by gap-filling. Again 
following Aristotle, equity relies on such gap filling insofar as the substantive rules of 
any system of rules will not always fit the specific case in the way the drafters of the rules 
envisioned.  In particular, habeas corpus can be a gap-filler in that its requirement of 
visibleness may inhibit kings and presidents from finding loop-holes by which prisoners 
can be abused, or where other forms of unfairness can creep into the system of law.  
                                                 
33 Gough., p. 15. 
34 See my discussion of the problems with custom in my book Crimes Against Humanity. 
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Habeas corpus minimally involves a deceptively simple procedure, namely, that a 
person must be brought out of the dungeon and have the charges against him or her 
publicly recited.  This procedure is a bulwark against some of the most serious forms of 
oppression.  Individuals are more secure because governments are deterred from 
incarcerating indefinitely, or threatening to do so, those who exercise their substantive 
rights to speech, press, or assembly.  The procedural right of habeas corpus helps secure 
these substantive rights.  Indeed, whatever the substantive rights are, habeas corpus will 
help secure them. Whatever the substantive rights, habeas corpus appeals make sure that 
there is a minimum of protection in a system of law that has those substantive rights at its 
core.  
As fundamental law, procedural rights like habeas corpus are also valued 
intrinsically in that they support basic fairness within the legal system. Such rights do not 
specify any right to a particular form of treatment or liberty that the State must protect.  
Rather these rights are what minimally must be done so that arbitrariness does not creep 
into the way that people are deprived of their liberty by being incarcerated.  And minimal 
procedural fairness translates into the embodiment of the moral fairness that is necessary 
for a system of law to be deserving of fidelity on the part of the population at large.  
When there is arbitrariness in the system of law the rule of law is disrupted and the 
system of law becomes fundamentally undermined. In this respect, Fuller was on the 
right track, although he seemed somewhat unsure where to place habeas corpus rights 
within his schema of procedural natural law. 
While it may be that substantive rights undergo change over time, having 
procedural rights remain constant is crucial, especially since there is much less need for 
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procedural rights to change over time.  Habeas corpus is of this sort – a procedural right 
that can remain fixed even as the particular substantive crimes that could lead to arrest 
and incarceration might vary over time.  Basic moral fairness is achieved in the system of 
law when there is such a fixed set of procedural guarantees as that provided by habeas 
corpus. Here habeas corpus that guarantees that no prisoner is locked away for arbitrary 
reasons, or as a way to deny other important moral rights of the prisoner, helps secure a 
foundational moral minimum. 
Both Hart and Fuller recognized the importance of procedural considerations to 
the rule of law.  Hart saw these procedures as secondary rules and Fuller saw them as 
desiderata for the rule of law.  Arguably, both theorists saw these procedures as a 
minimal moral core, although Hart continued to downplay the sense of morality here.  In 
taking as my point of departure this part of the Hart/Fuller debate what I have stressed, 
though, is the point of seeming agreement between them that if there is to be a system of 
criminal law (whether domestic or international), not merely a set of laws, then attention 
needs to be placed on procedural not merely substantive rights.  
The Hart/Fuller debate highlights the importance of procedural rights and also 
raises the question of whether there is a sense that fundamental fairness requires certain 
procedures, placing limits on constructivist approaches to procedural justice.  Whether 
we call the fundamental rights properly moral or not, certain procedural rights must be 
contained as secondary rules if there is to be a fair system of law.  As I will next claim, in 
international law in general, and international criminal law in particular, attention needs 
to be placed as much on procedural or secondary rules and tights as on primary or 
substantive rules and rights.  And there is a very practical benefit to this attention.  
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Looking to the global right of habeas corpus provides a way to fill gaps and prevent legal 
black holes such as existed at Guantanamo Bay. 
 
V. Habeas Corpus and International Law 
 Several recent international criminal decisions have addressed habeas corpus 
rights, but only in the context of specific proceedings already begun at The Hague, not in 
a broader context that would apply habeas to cases like that at Guantanamo Bay where a 
gap existed in the system of international law. In the Kanyabashi case, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), recognized the international right of habeas 
corpus, but confined it to “a review of the legality of detention” of those accused who are 
currently held by the ICTR.35  In this way, habeas corpus is restricted in two significant 
respects. First, there is an attempt to restrict the scope of habeas proceedings so that it 
only concerns the prima facie legality of the arrest and incarceration, not allowing habeas 
corpus petitions to be granted where there is a prima facie case for the conviction of the 
person incarcerated.  Secondly, habeas is restricted only to arrest and detention of those 
who are currently held by international tribunals and courts. I take up the first issue in the 
current section and the second issue in the next section. 
 Two very important things come out of the ICTR decisions in the early part of the 
first decade in the 21st century.  First, the right of habeas corpus was there recognized as a 
fundamental, or jus cogens, right.  This in effect gives habeas corpus the status of 
fundamental international law.  But second, this right was greatly limited – making it a 
much more restricted procedural right than is true in Anglo-American Common Law. 
                                                 
35 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, Case No. 
ICTR-96-15-I, May 23, 2000, Decision of the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and 
for Stoppage of the Proceedings, para. 28. 
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Indeed, in the Barayagwiza case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber ultimately reversed the 
dismissal of the charges against Barayagwiza with prejudice, reinstating the case, despite 
the seemingly egregious violations of habeas corpus.   
 For my purposes, one of the most important findings of the string of cases at the 
ICTR is that habeas corpus is a fundamental right of international humanitarian law.  It is 
not surprising that there was such a ruling, given that the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights had listed the right against arbitrary arrest.  But it is one thing to have 
the substantive right against arbitrary arrest recognized, and quite another matter to have 
a specific procedure, like habeas corpus, protected as a fundamental right as well. There 
is in my view a significant difference between the recognition that people have a 
substantive right not to be arbitrarily incarcerated, and the procedural right to what is 
necessary to enforce the substantive right through a review to determine if one has been 
arbitrarily incarcerated.  In the case of habeas corpus there is also a non-instrumental 
reason to elevate it to jus cogens status as well. 
Christian Tomuschat, a very well respected international legal theorist talks of jus 
cogens norms, the most fundamental norms of international law, as “rules of conduct 
which proscribe certain attacks on a number of particularly cherished goods of the 
international community.”36 Democracy and the rule of law are goods, even if not the 
sort of goods that are typically listed as important human goods, such as health and w
being. Rather than goods of bodily integrity, for instance, the rule of law is a good of 
fairness.  Indeed, fairness is cherished by the international community as is true of all 
ell-
                                                 
36 Christian Tomuschat, “Concluding Remarks,” in The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal 
Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, edited by Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhof, 2006, p. 430. 
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communities.  Insofar as it is an important good, the rule of law should be promoted as 
should those things that are constitutive of it, such as habeas corpus. 
One author has summarized the state of procedural rights in terms of the idea of 
internationally recognized jus cogens norms as follows: 
in addition to the substantive rights expressly declared to be non-derogable, a 
number of procedural rights which are instrumental to the effective protection of 
non-derogable rights, must also be respected in all circumstances.  Among them is 
the right to have access to the domestic courts for violations of non-derogable 
rights, and the right of habeas corpus.  Some fundamental aspects of the right to 
fair trial are also generally considered as non-derogable.37  
I would only add that some procedural rights, such as habeas corpus, should be seen as 
jus cogens even if not strongly instrumental in this way.  The intrinsic value of habeas 
corpus also needs to be recognized. 
If there is to be an international rule of law certain core rights will have to be 
protected against abuse wherever in the world that abuse occurs.  And a good example is 
the failure of the United States government to provide core procedural rights at the prison 
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  It seemed as if there was a legal black hole, and indeed that 
was just what certain members of George Bush’s administration actually advocated.  If 
human rights are to be protected globally, and if there is to be a system of international 
criminal law, protecting such procedural rights as habeas corpus across the world is 
crucial.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Silvia Borelli, “Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the 
“War on Terror,” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, no. 857, March 2005, (pp. 39-86), p. 55. 
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VI. Habeas Corpus and Guantanamo Bay 
I wish to conclude by offering a set of reasons to think that habeas corpus should 
be protected by international legal institutions in a much less restricted way than 
international criminal law (ICL) case law has so far recognized. I will turn now to the 
much more controversial and much richer global habeas right that would apply to all 
accused, not just those held at The Hague or in Arusha, to have their cases reviewed by 
the ICC or some comparable international court that has compulsory jurisdiction.  I will 
begin by briefly rehearsing some of the facts of the Guantanamo case that has motivated 
my study. 
After September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies arrested hundreds of 
supposed enemies of the United States in Afghanistan.  Starting in January of 2002, many 
of those arrested were transferred to a prison at Guantanamo Bay.  The detainees were 
held in captivity without access to legal counsel and without even having their names 
released or the charges against them publicly proclaimed.  One administration official 
said that the principal motivation for transfer to Guantanamo was that it was “the legal 
equivalent of outer space.” And a British judge referred to Guantanamo detainees as 
existing in a US created “legal black hole.”38 
In 2002 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) considered a 
petition from some of the detainees at Guantanamo who argued that their habeas corpus 
rights had been violated.  On March 22 of that year the Commission issued 
“precautionary measures in favor of the detainees being held by the United States at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” The Commission “decided to request that the United States 
                                                 
38 Sylvia Borelli, “Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the 
‘War on Terror,’” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, no. 857, March 2005, note 22, p. 45, and 
note 6, p. 41. 
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take urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay determined by a competent tribunal.”  The United States disputed the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.  The Commission rejected the United States’ objections and maintained its 
request.  The matter was never resolved as the “Commission did not subsequently receive 
any information indicating that its request for precautionary measures had been complied 
with.” But despite the Inter-American Commission reiterating its concern about the 
Guantanamo detainees each year after its initial issuing of precautionary measures, there 
is little evidence that the United States changed its behavior or policies. The only solace 
for the IACHR came when the United States Supreme Court ruled similarly to it in 2005 
and again in 2008, although to this date most detainees have still not been “produced” or 
had the charges against them publicly proclaimed by their jailers. 
The habeas corpus petitions of several Guantanamo detainees were also filed in 
US courts.  Initially, in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that habeas corpus petitions could be filed by these detainees. Some lower 
courts affirmed and other courts denied their appeals.  Congress then passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 attempting to strip Guantanamo detainees of habeas corpus rights.  
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the importance of habeas corpus and ruled that the Detainee Treatment Act 
was not relevant to cases already pending before it.  Congress then passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 stripping habeas and other judicial appeals from all 
Guantanamo detainees  regardless of whether their cases were pending before US courts 
or not. In Boumedienne v. Bush, 53 U.S. _____(2008), a deeply divided US Supreme 
Court ruled that the Military Commissions Act was unconstitutional because of its denial 
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of the fundamental right of habeas corpus as an instrument of the protection of individual 
liberty and the rule of law.   
What is most significant, as a matter of international law, is that the Inter-
American Commission did not feel it could take stronger measures against the United 
States in the Guantanamo case.  Indeed, even after it became clear that the United States 
would ignore the Commission’s Precautionary Measures, the Commission did not seek 
further measures to protect the Guantanamo detainees, who the commission admitted 
were at grave risk.  It is striking that there has never been a decision of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights against the United States on this issue or 
anything stronger from the Commission than the “request” that was articulated above.  
So, while it is true that the Inter-American Commission at least took up the issue of the 
deprivation of rights of the Guantanamo detainees, the result is quite far from minimally 
satisfactory – calling into question the ability of at least this particular regional human 
rights commission, if not the entire structure of human rights commissions, to protect 
procedural rights such as those of habeas corpus. 
My view is that more is needed to enforce such procedural rights than is currently 
on offer.  Part of the difficulty is that violations of procedural rights simply do not 
capture people’s imagination the way that violations of substantive rights do.  When the 
substantive crimes of genocide or ethnic cleansing occur, the “conscience” of the world’s 
community is easily aroused.  And so it matters less whether the protections offered are 
regional or global, although with the institution of the International Criminal Court, there 
is what promises to be an effective global enforcement mechanism for these substantive 
rights violations to go along with the regional bases of protection. 
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So far, procedural rights have been protected, if at all, largely through regional 
human rights commissions and courts.  The regional human rights commissions and 
courts are not part of the international criminal justice system but form their own separate 
system of international human rights law. But there are international institutions that 
operate globally, not merely regionally, and secure substantive rights.  The Security 
Council is empowered to sanction States that would violate the global norm against 
aggression. The International Criminal Court provides sanctions for violations of the 
global norms against genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Piracy and 
slavery have been condemned in large multi-lateral treaties that are enforced by aut 
dedere aut judicare principles mandating that States either prosecute or extradite those 
responsible for such violations of global norms.39 Procedural rights need a similarly 
global protection institution. 
What I envision could be simply understood as an international court of appeals 
from the regional courts and commissions of human rights.  Or such a court could also, in 
a limited set of contexts, be an international court of first impression where one did not 
have to exhaust all other remedies before these regional courts.  Or the court could also 
be a court handling appeals from decisions rendered by domestic or regional courts.  
Whatever is its form something like a Global Court of Equity is needed to deal with the 
procedural rights that must be protected for an international rule of law. The upshot 
would be that there would no longer be legal black holes where detainees could languish 
in prison for years without ever having charges against them publicly proclaimed.   
                                                 
39 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite 
in International Law, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995. 
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 Many who have written on the rule of law have not recognized the central role of 
habeas corpus.  Lon Fuller only mentions habeas corpus once in his lengthy chapter on 
the rule of law in his book The Morality of Law,40 and Hart does not mention it at all.  
And even Fuller does not give to habeas corpus the sort of role in procedural due process 
that I have argued that it should have. But both Hart and Fuller certainly supply the 
theoretical basis for supporting habeas corpus rights, especially at the international level.  
The seemingly innocuous right that a prisoner be brought out of the dungeon and have 
the charges against him or her publicly proclaimed is indeed crucial for the protection of 
many other substantive rights, but it is also a value in itself insofar as it is a crucial 
component of the rule of law. And when thinking about the international rule of law, 
habeas corpus should be one of the first rights protected. Natural justice, as understood 
from Aristotle’s time to the present, demands as much. 
 
                                                 
40 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 81. 
